The cognitive interference channel with confidential messages (CICC) proposed by Liang et al. is investigated. When the security is considered in coding systems, it is well-known that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoding to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to an eavesdropper. For the CICC, the tradeoff between the rate of the random number to realize the stochastic encoding and the communication rates is investigated, and the optimal tradeoff is completely characterized. number is quite precious resource. For example, generation rates of any existing true random number generators are not as fast as communication rates of wireless networks [12] . Although the random number generator equipped in the forthcoming Intel's CPU can generate the random number as fast as 3Gbps [13] , the communication rate of the new IEEE wireless communication standard is said to be over Gbps [14]. Thus, the random number should be regarded as at least as precious as communication resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio has attracted considerable attention recently, for it can improve the spectrum efficiency of wireless networks [1] . In information theoretical study of the cognitive radio, it is usually modeled by a interference channel called cognitive interference channel (CIC), in which the cognitive transmitter can non-causally know the other transmitter's message [2] - [5] . We consider the (CIC) model investigated by Jiang et. al. [6] , Zhong et. al. [7] , and Liang et. al. [8] , in which one receiver needs to decode both messages. Especially as in [8] , we also consider the security, i.e., the message sent by the cognitive transmitter must be kept secret from one of the receivers. We call this problem the cognitive interference channel with confidential messages (CICC). The coding system investigated in this paper is described in Fig. 1 .
When security is considered, it is well known that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoder to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential message to be leaked to the eavesdropper Receiver 2. The stochastic encoder is usually realized by preparing a random number in addition to the intended messages and by encoding them to a transmitted signal by a deterministic encoder. Furthermore, random numbers are also needed to realize the coding technique called Fig. 1 . The coding system investigated in this paper. Sender 1 sends common message K n , private message L n , and confidential message S n by using a deterministic function f n and a limited amount of randomness A n . Sender 2 also sends a signal X n 2 which is a deterministic function of the common message K n . The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Receiver 1 and Receiver 2. The private message is supposed to be decoded by Receiver 1, and we do not care whether Receiver 2 can decode the private message or not. The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Receiver 1, and it must be kept completely secret from Receiver 2. channel prefixing. Thus, coding schemes for secrecy need quite large amount of randomness, and it is theoretically interesting to understand how much randomness is needed for secure communication. In fact, as was clarified in the authors' previous work on the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) [16] , existing schemes may not be optimal in general if we take the amount of randomness into account. For this purpose, we formulate the problem of the CICC by randomness constrained stochastic encoder, and completely characterize the capacity region of this new problem. We assume that the non-cognitive transmitter, Sender 2, only uses a deterministic encoding. This assumption seems natural because Sender 2 only observes the common message, and the common message need not to be kept secret.
Although the main motivation of the present problem is of theoretical interest, it also has the following practical meaning. In literatures of information theoretic security (see [9] - [11] ), randomness has been regarded as free resource, and the amount of the random number used in the stochastic encoding has been paid no attention. However in practice, the random the authors' series of works. In [15] , the authors investigated the capacity region of the relay channel with confidential messages for the completely deterministic encoder, and the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) for the completely deterministic encoder was characterized as a corollary. In [16] , the authors completely characterized the capacity region of the BCC by the randomness constrained stochastic encoder. The problem formulation in this paper is the extension of that in [16] to the CIC, and more involved coding techniques are needed.
Since the security criterion employed in this paper is slightly different from that in [8] , it should be remarked. In [8] , the cognitive transmitter, Sender 1, sends two kinds of messages, the common message and the confidential message, and the level of secrecy of the confidential message was evaluated by the equivocation rate. In this paper, Sender 1 sends three kinds of messages, the common message, the private message, and the confidential message. The role of the common message is the same as that in [8] . The private message is supposed to be decoded by one of the receiver, Receiver 1, and we do not care whether Receiver 2 can decode the private message or not. On the other hand, the confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Receiver 1, and it must be kept completely secret from Receiver 2. The secrecy of the confidential message is evaluated by the so-called strong security criterion [17] , [18] . As a by-product, our direct coding theorem is stronger than that in [8] , i.e., our theorem states the strong secrecy. To prove the strong secrecy, the channel resolvabiity [19] plays an important role. The channel resolvability is recognized as a useful tool to prove the strong secrecy these days (see [20] , [21] ). To prove the strong secrecy for the present problem, we use the channel resolvability for superposition coding shown by the authors in [16] , which is an extension of the bounding technique in [22] .
The reason we do not use the equivocation rate formulation is as follows. In the conventional equivocation rate formulation, if the rate of randomness is not sufficient, a part of the confidential message is sacrificed to make the other part completely secret and the rate of the completely secret part corresponds to the equivocation rate. We think that the rates of sacrificed part and completely secret part become clearer by employing our formulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the problem formulation is explained, and main results are presented in Section III. In Section IV, the proof of the main theorem is presented. Some technical arguments are presented in Appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let P Y |X 1 X 2 and P Z |X 1 X 2 be two channels with common input alphabets X 1 × X 2 and output alphabets Y and Z respectively. Throughout the paper, the alphabets are assumed to be finite though we do not use finiteness of the alphabet except cardinality bounds on auxiliary random variables.
Let K n be the set of the common message, L n be the set of the private message, and S n be the set of the confidential message. The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Receiver 1 and Receiver 2. The private message is supposed to be decoded by Receiver 1, and we do not care whether Receiver 2 can decode the private message or not. The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Receiver 1, and it must be kept completely secret from Receiver 2.
Typically, Sender 1 uses a stochastic encoder to make the confidential message secret from Receiver 2, and it is practically realized by using a uniform randomness on the alphabet A n . When the size |A n | of randomness is infinite, any stochastic encoder from K n × L n × S n to X n 1 can be simulated by a deterministic encoder f n : K n × L n × S n × A n → X n . But we are interested in the case with bounded size |A n | in this paper. In this paper, we assume that Sender 2 only use a deterministic encoder f n : K n → X n 2 . The decoder of Receiver 1 is defined by function g n : Y n → K n × L n × S n and the error probability is defined as P err ( f n , f n , g n ) = k n ∈K n n ∈L n s n ∈S n a n ∈A n
where 1[·] is the indicator function. The decoder of Receiver 2 is defined by function φ n : Z n → K n and the error probability P err ( f n , f n , φ n ) is defined in a similar manner as (1). Let PZ n |S n (z n |s n ) = k n ∈K n n ∈L n a n ∈A n 1 |K n ||L n ||A n | × P n Z |X 1 X 2 (z n | f n (k n , n , s n , a n ), f n (k n )),
be the output distributions of the channel P n Z |X 1 X 2 . In this paper, we consider the security criterion given by
where D(· ·) is the divergence, and I (·; ·) is the mutual information [23] . The coding system investigate in this paper is depicted in Fig. 1 .
In this paper, we are interested in the trade-off among the rate of the randomness, and the rates of the common, private, and confidential messages.
is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of deterministic encoder of Sender 1 f n : K n × L n × S n × A n → X n 1 , deterministic encoder of Sender 2 f n : K n → X n 2 , the decoder of Receiver 1 g n : Y n → K n × L n × S n , and the decoder of Receiver 2 φ n : Z n → K n such that lim n→∞ P err ( f n , f n , g n ) = 0,
lim sup
lim inf
Then the achievable region R is defined as the set of all achievable rate quadruples.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The following is our main result in this paper.
Then we have R = R * . Moreover, it may be assumed that the ranges of U and V may be assumed to satisfy
Proof: See Section IV. In addition to the input signals X 1 and X 2 , the region R * is described by two auxiliary random variables U and V . The roles of these random variables are as follows: the signal X 2 is used to send a part of common message K n . The other part of the common message is superposed to X 2 by auxiliary random variable U . Then, private message L n and confidential message S n are superposed to (X 2 , U ) by auxiliary random variable V . Finally, the randomness A n is further superposed to V by input signal X 1 . The crucial part of the coding scheme is that we do not use the so-called channel prefixing technique to generate the input signal X 1 . Instead of the channel prefixing, we generate the input signal by encoding the randomness A n as in the superposition coding. This type of coding technique was first proposed by Chia and El Gamal [24] . For the detail of the coding scheme, see Section IV.
Remark 1: As we will find in the achievability proof of the main theorem, the private message can be used as randomness to protect the confidential message from Receiver 2. Thus, if we define the achievability rate regionR by replacing (7) with
regionR is broader than region R. Indeed,R is a closed convex set consisting of those quadruple (R d , R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exist auxiliary random variables (U, V ) satisfying the same conditions as Theorem 1 except (13). Remark 2: (14) means that there is a certain amount of randomness that cannot be substituted by the private message. Note that the difference between the private message and the randomness is whether Receiver 1 needs to decode it or not.
When there is no randomness constraint, region
coincide with the result obtained by Liang et. al. [8] .
IV. PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS

A. Proof of Direct Part of Theorem 1
The direct part of Theorem 1 follows from the following Corollary 2 and Lemma 2.
We first show the following. Lemma 1: Let R (in) be a closed convex set consisting of those quadruples (R d , R 0 , R 1 , R s ) for which there exist r 1 ≥ 0 and auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that
Then we have R (in) ⊂ R.
Proof: See Section IV-B. We note the following observation. From the definition of the problem, if
Thus, Lemma 1 implies the following corollary. 
Then we haveR (in) ⊂ R. By using the Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we can also show the following.
Lemma 2: We have
B. Proof of Lemma 1
For a while, we consider the case with n = 1 and omit the superscript and subscript to simplify the notation. We first split the private message as L = I ×J . For each common message k ∈ K, we randomly generate codeword x 2k according to distribution P X 2 . We denote such a code C 0 . For each k and each i ∈ I, we randomly generate codeword u ki according to distribution P U |X 2 (·|x 2k ). We denote such a code C 1 . For each (k, i ) and for each ( j, s) ∈ J × S, we randomly generate codeword v ki j s according to distribution P V |U X 2 (·|u ki , x 2k ). We denote such a code C 2 . For each (k, i, j ) and for each a ∈ A, we randomly generate codeword x 1ki j sa according to distribution P X 1 |V (·|v ki j s ). We denote such a code C 3 . Let
and let T = T 1 ∩ T 2 ∩ T 3 . Receiver 2 decodes only k by using the indirect decoding proposed in [25] . The decoding region of Receiver 2 is defined by Receiver 1 decodes (k, i, j, s) . The decoding region of Receiver 1 is defined by
i.e., g(y) = (k, i, j, s) if y ∈ D ki j s . Then we have the following. Lemma 3:
We have
and
where
We apply Lemma 3 for asymptotic case. For (R d , R 0 , R 1 R s ) ∈ R (in) and arbitrary small δ > 0, we set |K n | = e n(R 0 −δ) , |I n | = e n(r 1 −δ) , |J n | = e n(R 1 −r 1 +2δ) , |S n | = e n(R s −4δ) , |A n | = e n(R d +2δ) , α 0 = I (U, X 2 ; Z )−δ,
|K n ||I n |e −α 0 n ≤ e −n(I (U,X 2 ;Z )−R 0 −r 1 +δ) converge to 0 asymptotically. Furthermore, by the law of large numbers, P n
, and P n U X 2 Z (T c 0,n ) also converge to 0 asymptotically. Since
exponentially converges to 0. Similarly, since
Thus, 1
exponentially converges to 0 asymptotically. This completes a proof of the lemma.
C. Proof of Converse Part of Theorem 1
Then, for arbitrary γ > 0, there exists n such that
By combining these inequalities with the following Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have the converse part of the theorem. The statement about the range size of U and V can be proved in the same manner as [8] . It should be noted that (9)-(12) are derived in the same manner as [8] and the construction of the auxiliary random variable are also the same. (13) and (14) are additionally proved in this paper by using the fact that the encoder of Sender 1 is deterministic given the randomness.
Lemma 4: There exists ε n → 0 such that log |K n | ≤ I (K n , X n 2 ; Y n ) + nε n , log |K n | ≤ I (K n , X n 2 ; Z n ) + nε n , log |L n ||S n | ≤ I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n , X n 2 ) + nε n , log |K n ||L n ||S n | ≤ I (K n , L n , S n , X n 2 ; Y n ) + nε n , log |K n ||L n ||S n | ≤ I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n , X n 2 ) + I (K n , X n 2 ; Z n ) + 2nε n , log |S n | ≤ I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n , X n 2 ) − I (L n , S n ; Z n |K n , X n 2 ) + 4nε n , log |L n ||A n | ≥ I (X n 1 ; Z n |K n , X n 2 ) − 2nε n , log |A n | ≥ I (X n 1 ; Z n |K n , L n , S n , X n 2 ).
Proof: By using Fano's inequality, we have log |K n | = H (K n ) = I (K n ; Y n ) + H (K n |Y n ) ≤ I (K n , X n 2 ; Y n ) + nε n , and log |K n | ≤ I (K n , X n 2 ; Z n ) + nε n . By using Fano's inequality and by noting that (K n , X n 2 ) and (L n , S n ) are independent, we have log |L n ||S n | = H (L n , S n ) = I (L n , S n ; Y n ) + H (L n , S n |Y n ) ≤ I (L n , S n ; K n , X n 2 , Y n ) + nε n = I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n , X n 2 ) + nε n . By using Fano's inequality, we also have log |K n ||L n ||S n | = H (K n , L n , S n ) ≤ I (K n , L n , S n , X n 2 ; Y n ) + nε n and
where the last equality follows from the fact that X n 2 is a determined from K n . By using the security condition and Fano's inequality, we have I (S n ; Z n |K n ) = I (S n , K n ; Z n ) − I (K n ; Z n ) = I (S n ; Z n ) + I (K n ; Z n |S n ) − I (K n ; Z n )
By using Fano's inequality and by using (18), we have
− H (L n |S n , K n ) + 4nε n ≤ I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n ) − I (L n , S n ; Z n |K n ) + 4nε n = I (L n , S n ; Y n |K n , X n 2 ) − I (L n , S n ; Z n |K n , X n 2 ) + 4nε n . By noting that f n is a deterministic function and by using (18), we have log |L n ||A n | ≥ H (X n 1 |K n , S n ) ≥ I (X n 1 ; Z n |K n , S n ) = I (X n 1 , S n ; Z n |K n ) − I (S n ; Z n |K n )
Finally, by noting that f n is a deterministic function, we have log |A n | ≥ H (X n 1 |K n , L n , S n ) ≥ I (X n 1 ; Z n |K n , L n , S n ) = I (X n 1 ; Z n |K n , L n , S n , X n 2 ).
Lemma 5: For fixed n, let T be the random variable that is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , n} and is independent of the other random variables. Define the following random variables:
Then, we have
a) Proof of (19) :
b) Proof of (20) :
c) Proof of (21) :
where (a) follows from the fact that (K n , L n , S n , X t −1 11 ,
, (X 1t ,X 2t ), and Z t form Markov chain.
APPENDIX
A. Channel Resolvability
Since we use a result of the channel resolvability problem [19] in the proof of our main result, we review the channel resolvability problem in this appendix. For simplicity of notation, we consider the so-called one-shot case, i.e., the block length is n = 1. In the channel resolvability problem, for the input distribution P X of the channel P Z |X , we want to simulate the response P Z of the channel, where
The simulation is conducted by a deterministic mapping ϕ : B → X , and uniform random number B on B. Let
be the output distribution with mapping ϕ. The purpose of the resolvability problem is to construct a mapping such that D(PZ P Z ) is small. In [16] , the following random coding construction of a mapping was proposed. We split the alphabet as B = M 1 × M 2 . Let P V X be a distribution such that the marginal is P X . We first randomly generate |M 2 | codewords v 1 , . . . , v |M 2 | according to the distribution P V . We denote the generated code by C 2 . Then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |M 2 |, we randomly generate |M 1 | codewords x i1 , . . . , x i|M 1 | according to the distribution P X |V (·|v i ). We denote the generated code by C 1 . For this construction we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6 ( [16] ): For 0 < θ, θ ≤ 1, we have
B. Proof of Lemma 3 a) Proof of (15) : We first not the following observation. By taking the average over randomly generated codes, we have
Let T uv x 2 = {y : (u, v, x 2 , y) ∈ T }. Then, we have
where we used
for y ∈ T uv x 2 in the last inequality. b) Proof of (16) :
In a similar manner as (27), we have
for z ∈ T 0,ux 2 in the last inequality. c) Proof of (17): By using the monotonicity of the divergence, we have
For each (k, i ), we use the relation
By using Lemma 6 for input distributions P V |U X 2 (·|u ki , x 2k ) and P X 1 |V and channel P Z |X 1 X 2 , we have
1 θ |J | θ e ψ(θ |P Z |U V X 2 (·|·,u ki ,x 2k ),P V |U X 2 (·|u ki ,x 2k )) . By taking the average over C 0 and C 1 , and by noting
we have
C. Proof of Lemma 2
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